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Abstract 
The study identifies the impact of tax planning on the firm value of consumer goods manufacturing 
companies in Cyprus. The specific objectives are to determine the impact of firm and leverage on firm value of 
Cypriot consumer goods manufacturing companies. The data included in the study were collected from the 
annual reports and accounts of consumer goods of the manufacturing companies in Cyprus and formulated 
hypotheses were tested with multiple regression analysis. The result had a positive effect on our leverage 
dependent variable. Based on the findings of the study, the application of the study with more samples may 
be recommended for future studies. 
Keywords: Tax Planning, Firm Size, Leverage And Firm Value 
Introductıon 
Tax planning has been a vital weapon to alleviate the effect of tax on liquidity and profitabilityof firms. 
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) measures the firm’s tax burden and can also look through the  performance of a firm. 
Increase in the profitability level of a firm will signals investors that the firm value is good and will attract more 
investors to invest. This is because the investors might know the firm has higher profitability by paying lower 
tax rate and able to provide higher return for  their  shareholders.  Tax  planning  represents  a  firm’s  
conscious  efforts  geared  towards reducing its tax liabilities, using means or strategies which could either be 
legal or illegal (Brian- Lee, Dobiyanski & Minton, 2015). This definition captures the very slim boundary 
between legal and illegal acts, which are not clear and explicit. Therefore, the legality of a firm’s tax reduction  
decision or strategy is determined by the authoritative bodies after the fact, that is, the tax authority relying 
on the Judiciary. Thus, there is no clear ex ante distinction between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion.  
Tax planning practices among firms are carried out by corporate managers. Managers, who are agents of 
Shareholders, ought to act in the interest of the principals (Jensen & Mechling, 1976). The burden of the tax 
paid by the company is eventually borne by shareholders since it brings about a reduction in the profit which 
is the basis for dividend payment (Amiram, Bauer, & Frank, 2013). The interest of shareholders in a company is 
measured in terms of the market value of their shareholdings, which is a reflection of their stake in that 
company (Ilaboya, Izevbekhai, Ohiokha, 2016). The aftermaths of management actions are usually reflected in 
the Stock returns which is the value gained or lost (whether realized or unrealized) on an investment in stock. 
The impulsive nature of stock returns in most sub-Sahara Africa countries calls for concerns and researches 
(Ogege, 2016). 
With the separation of ownership from management, tax planning actions could become possible 
opportunities for managers to pursue self-interests (Desai & Dharmapala 2006). Would the effect of agency 
costs be significant enough to become disadvantageous to shareholders? Under the agency framework, 
relevant efforts must be made to mitigate such effect of managerial diversion. Following Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) submission that the benefits of tax avoidance activities in saving tax charges are possib ly 
offset by the potential managerial rent extraction for firms with poor governance structure, the benefits and 
the net effect of corporate tax avoidance are likely to be greater for firms with measures in place to mitigate 
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agency cost. Complex tax planning practices can provide management with the tools, masks, and justifications 
for opportunistic managerial behaviors, such as earnings manipulations, related party transactions, and other 
resource-diverting activities. Thus, tax savings from tax planning may not eventually bring about an increase in 
firm value. Firm value is generally taken to mean an economic measure reflecting the market value of a whole 
business. It is a summation of the claims of all contributors to the assets of a firm namely: creditor s (secured 
and unsecured) and equity holders. In finance literature, firm value is the sum of the market value of equity 
and the market value of debt Nwaobia, Kwarbai and Ajibade, 2015). Firm value is enhanced when 
shareholders’ wealth is increased through profits and improved cash flow; hence the importance of tax 
planning as an integral part of the financial planning programme of any entity.  
The study by Desai and Dharmapala (2007) examined the link between tax planning, corporate governance 
and firm performance. In their study, Firms’ performance is measured using Tobin’s q and governance quality 
is proxied by the level of institutional ownership. Tax planning is measured by inferring the difference between 
the income reported to capital markets and tax authorities (the book-tax-gap). Results of analyses revealed 
that the average effect of tax planning on corporate performance is not significantly different from zero. In 
other words, there is no relationship between tax planning and firm performance. The s tudy however reports a 
positive association between tax planning savings and performance for well-governed firms. The study 
concluded that corporate governance mediates the tax planning-firm performance relationship. Corporate tax 
avoidance could be detrimental to firm value when the manager-shareholder goals are not aligned due to 
agency problem of lack of goal congruence (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). This suggests the likely effects of 
agency problem on the nexus which prompts us to examine the moderating effects of corporate governance 
monitoring and goal congruence (all are managerial entrenchment mechanisms for mitigating agency costs 
associated with the separation of ownership from control.) on the effect of corporate tax avoidance practices 
on the firm value of non-financial quoted firms in Cyprus.  
Tax planning in the study was measured by firm’s tax saving. At times, certain firms are not good in making 
tax planning. Therefore, the management of the firm will then employ tax experts in handling the tax  planning 
for that firm. This will increase the firm’s cost because they need to pay them more than ordinary employee’s 
salary. There is therefore need to verify the tax planning firm value nexus using firms quoted in the Cyprus 
stock exchange, and possible medium for improving the impact for shareholders’ benefit.  
The study determines the effect of Tax Planning on firm value of consumer goods manufacturing companies 
in Cyprus. The specific objectives are to:  
1. Determine the effect of firm size on firm value of Cyprus consumer goods manufacturing companies. 
2. Examine the effect of leverage on firm value of Cyprus consumer goods manufacturing companies. 
Revıew of Related Lıterature 
Conceptual Framework 
Tax Planning 
In my study ‘Tax planning and firm value: evidence from European companies’ using Regression analysis 
model (Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression). Tobin’s q model was adopted by the study to examine 
the relationship between firms’ value and tax planning with firm size, leverage, capital intensity, Dividend and 
Earnings management. 
As control variables, the study found that tax planning can be considered as steps taken by taxpayers so as to 
reduce tax liability in obtaining the tax saving benefits. The correlation analysis reveals that the correlation 
coefficients between various independent and control variables are significant.  
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Tax planning represents a firm’s conscious efforts directed at reducing its tax liabilities by adopting 
approaches which could either be legal or illegal (Brian-Lee, Dobiyanski & Minton, 2015). The legality of a 
firm’s tax reduction decision or strategy is determined by the judicial interpretation of the relevant tax code as 
there is no clear ex ante distinction between the legal tax avoidance and the illegal tax evasion. A firm’s tax 
avoidance strategy can be placed anywhere on the continuum depending upon the degree of aggressiveness 
the firm pursues in the course of reducing its tax liabilities (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010) 
This weakness of not accurately capturing non-conforming tax planning prompted Dyreng, Hanlon and 
Maydew (2008) to introduce an alternative tax planning measure, the cash Effective Tax Rate. It is the ratio of 
cash tax paid to adjusted pretax income, where both the numerator and denominator are summed over a 
multi-year time period, usually three to five years, to ensure a smooth transition shock to cash tax paid as well 
as pre-tax income. Significantly, tax such as changes to tax reserve or the valuation allowance does not affect 
cash tax paid (Badertscher, Katz, Rego & Wilson, 2015). 
Other book tax difference measures used in measuring non-conforming tax avoidance include the total book 
tax difference, calculated as the difference between pretax income and estimated taxable income (Mill s, 1998; 
Desai, 2003). The permanent book tax difference is another measure which is believed to capture tax planning 
strategies (Weisbach, 2002; Macgill & Outslay, 2004). Researchers have also used the discretionary permanent 
book tax difference, which excludes permanent difference over which management has little control (Frank, 
Lynch, Rego, 2009). Badertscher, Katz, Rego and Wilson (2015) gave obvious reasons why researchers mainly 
focus on corporate tax avoidance measures that captures non-conforming tax strategies only. First, public 
limited companies usually prefer non-conforming tax strategies in reducing taxable income without reducing 
book income. The second reason is the lack of a generally accepted measure of conforming tax planning in 
the accounting literature. 
The decision to enter into an aggressive tax planning scheme involves balancing the costs and benefits 
involved. The main benefits of corporate tax aggressiveness are increased cash and liquidity, increased after -
tax profits represented in a firm’s performance metrics such as earnings  per share, a reduced tax liability, a 
reduced effective tax rate that can send a positive signal to investors, thereby reducing the cost of equity 
capital (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009) 
Value of Firm 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) opined that firm value is determined by company’s asset earnings power. It 
implies therefore that, when the impact of asset earnings power is positive, the company is doing well, and its 
asset turnover will be more efficient, and this results in high profit. Firm value may be measured from two 
perspectives: from the point of view of accounting measure of profitability: return on assets (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q, net profit margin; and from the stock market perspective, using the share prices from 
the Stock Exchange market. 
Firm value Scholars have widely employed Tobins Q as a proxy for firm value, particularly in valuing publicly 
traded companies (Nwaobia, Kwarbai & Ajibade, 2015; Tahir and Razali, 2011;  Smithson & Simkins 2005). This 
study used approximate Tobin’s Q as introduced by Pruit  (1994)  and  used  in  Nwaobia,  Kwarbai  &  
Ajibade,  (2015).  It  is  calculated  thus: Approximate Tobins Q = MVE+PS+DEBT/TA 
Where: MVE: market value of equity PS: The liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock 
DEBT: The value of firms’ short term liabilities net of its short term asset, PLUS the book value of the firm’s 
long term debt TA: The book value of the total assets of the firm Price Book Value (PBV) is ratio showing 
whether stock price is above or below book value price of the shares. The higher this ratio is, the higher 
market trust towards prospect of the company is. Dividend Yield Ratio is ratio that shows the current rate of 
income earned from stock Investments Dividend Payout Ratio (DPR) is ratio that shows the amount of profit 
paid to shareholders in the form of dividends. 
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Company value in this study will be measured by (PBV) to show the company's ability to create a relative value 
of capital. Price book value (PBV) is a ratio that indicates whether the stock price (market price) is traded 
above or below the book value of the shares (Brigham, 2012). The ratio of stock price to the book value of the 
company or PBV shows the level of ability of the company creates a value relative to the amount of capital 
invested. Harmono (2009) explains that high PBV reflects the high stock price compared to the book value of 
the stock. The higher the stock price, the more successful the company creates value for shareholders. The 
success of the company creates that value of course gives hope to shareholders in the form of bigger profit. 
Simply stated that price book value (PBV) is the market ratio used to measure the performance of the stock 
market price against the value of the book. The higher the PBV means the market believes in the prospect of 
the company. The researchers use PBV as a measure of the company value with the following reasons:  
Leverage 
Leverage is the result of using borrowed capital as a source of funding when investing to expand the firm’s 
asset base and generate returns on risk capital. Leverage is an investment strategy of using borrowed money: 
specifically, the use of various financial instruments or borrowed capital to increase the potential return of an 
investment. Leverage can also refer to the amount of debt used to finance assets. When one refers to 
something (a company, a property or an investment) as "highly leveraged," it means that, the item has more 
debt than equity (Towery (2012).  
In finance, leverage (sometimes referred to, as gearing in the United K ingdom and Australia) is any technique 
involving the use of borrowed funds in the purchase of an asset, with the expectation that the after tax 
income from the asset and asset price appreciation will exceed the borrowing cost. Leveraging enables gains 
and losses to be multiplied. On the other hand, there is a risk that leveraging will result in a loss — i.e., when 
actually it turns out that financing costs exceed the income from the asset, or because the value of the asset 
has fallen. 
While leverage magnifies profits when the returns from the asset is more to offset the costs of borrowing, 
leverage may also magnify losses. A corporation that borrows too much money might face bankruptcy or 
default during a business downturn, while a less-leveraged corporation might survive. An investor who buys a 
stock on 50% margin will lose 40% if the stock declines 20 % ( Leory & Babra 2008).  
Risk may be attributed to a loss in value of collateral assets. Brokers may require the addition of funds when 
the value of securities holds declines. Banks may fail to renew mortgages when the value of real estate 
declines below the debt's principal. Even if cash flows and profits are sufficient to maintain the ongoing 
borrowing costs, loans may be called. This may happen exactly when there is little market liquidity and sales 
by others at depressing prices. It means that as things get bad, leverage goes up, multiplying losses as things 
continue to go down. This can lead to rapid ruin, even if the underlying asset value decline is mild or 
temporary. Leory and Babra (2008) noted that the risk can be mitigated by negotiating the terms of leverage, 
by maintaining unused room for additional borrowing, and by leveraging only liquid assets Heitzman,( 2010).  
Size of Firm  
Corporate tax planning is a professional activity that demands the requisite resources and skills for its effective 
execution. It follows therefore that Firm size and capacity in terms of resources available to the firm is believed 
to directly correlate with the extent of a firm’s tax planning activities (Nwaobia, 2014). To design and execute a 
robust tax planning scheme requires the employment of tax experts to man the tax department. Where the 
company decides to outsource, enormous outflow of resources goes with the payment of  the attendant 
professional fees. Based on this reality, Md Noor, Fadzillah and Mastuki (2010) submit that not all companies 
have the same opportunities to carry out tax planning. It is therefore imperative to control for the effect of the 
size of the firm on tax planning studies. Khaoula, Amor & Ayed (2013) and Rego (2003)  
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observe that larger firms can achieve economies of scale via tax planning and have the resources and 
incentives to decrease group tax. Large firms are reported to have sufficient resources and better 
opportunities to undertake tax planning strategies, for example, by utilizing the tax incentives provided to 
them. 
Review of Empirical Studies 
Previous studies have investigated the relationship between book-tax differences and earnings growth. 
However, these studies provide mix results pertaining to the relationship between these two constructs. For 
instance, Lev and Nissim (2004) examine the relationship between temporary book-tax differences and 
earnings growth. In this perspective, the authors find that temporary book-tax differences and earnings 
growth are not related. 
Hanlon (2005) examined the relationship involving temporary book-tax differences and earnings growth, and 
finds a negative relationship between book-tax differences and earnings growth. In other words, firms with 
large temporary book-tax differences exhibit less earnings persistence. Dhaliwal Gleason, and Mills (2004) 
investigated whether income tax expense is regularly used to achieve earnings targets and concluded that 
aggressive tax expense provides a final opportunity to meet earnings targets after the firm has agreed to any 
pre-tax adjusting entries required by the independent auditors. The study by Desai and Dharmapala (2007) 
examined the link between tax planning, corporate governance and firm performance.  
In their study, Firms’ performance is measured using Tobin’s q and governance quality is proxied by the level 
of institutional ownership. The study reported that the average effect of tax planning on corporate 
performance is not significantly different from zero. In other words, there is no relationship between tax 
planning and firm performance. The study however reports a positive association between tax planning 
savings and performance for well-governed firms. The study noted that as tax planning activities increase, the 
tax costs and risks outweigh the benefits.  
The study of Desai and Dharmapala (2009) ascertained the relationship between tax planning, corporate 
governance and firm’s performance. In their study, they used Tobin’s Q, governance quality and book tax gap 
as their proxy. However, there is a positive relationship between tax planning savings and value of well 
governed firms. So, in the end they conclude it as corporate governance is needed to assis t the performance 
of firm that adopts tax planning. Guenther, Matsunaga and Williams (2013) distinguish between the concepts  
of tax avoidance, tax aggressiveness, and tax risk and examine which, if any, of those concepts is related to 
overall firm risk. Prior research has argued that aggressive corporate tax avoidance, as measured by low cash 
effective tax rates or high reserves for unrecognized tax benefits, increases firm risk, thereby requiring firms to 
provide risk-taking incentives to managers.  
Antonio and Giliard (2014) investigates whether family firms are more aggressive in terms of tax planning than 
non-family firms in Brazil, based on a sample of firms listed on the BMF and Bovespa from 2001 to 2012. Of 
the sample of companies, 23% are considered to be family firms. They found a significant relationship 
between classification as a family firm and tax aggressiveness, based on two metrics. The family firms in the 
sample were more tax aggressive than the non-family firms. For the variable BTD, family firms presented a 
positive sign, indicating a tendency for higher BTD. In turn, ETR had a negative sign, identifying a tendency for 
family firms to pay lower taxes. 
Ohnuma (2014) analyzed corporate tax avoidance as a determinant of executive compensation b ased on 
equity risk incentives using correlation and a multivariate regression analyses. He finds a negative association 
between tax aggressiveness and the adoption of stock options. Also he reports a significant relationship 
existing between equity risk incentives and tax aggressiveness. 
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Saidu, and Ibrahim (2015) assess the effect of corporate taxation on dividend policy of listed consumer goods 
companies in Cyprus over the periods 2009 to 2013. Data for the study was collected from the annual reports 
and accounts of the companies. A panel data methodology was employed specifically using pooled OLS, fixed 
effect and random effect regression methods in analyzing the data. The paper demonstrated that corporate 
taxation and board structure have no effect on dividend policy of firms. The results also imply that 
performance of companies is an important determinant of dividend policy. Galica (2015) determined the 
complexities of corporate tax planning, with a focus on tax deferral strategies employed by United Sta tes 
multinational corporations, providing a financial and ethical analysis of corporate tax entities. The focus will be 
on multinational corporations, primarily Fortune five hundred companies.  
The study reported that foundational background on corporate tax havens, the benefits of deferred taxation, 
and an outsider’s perspective on the subject matter – namely, the difference in perception of the general 
public versus that of a shareholder. Antônio and Tatiana (2015) provided evidence regarding the relationship 
between book-tax differences (BTD), persistence of earnings and accruals and tax planning in the Brazilian 
scenario.  
The sample corresponds to all industrial and commercial firms listed on the BMF&Bovespa that disclosed 
consolidated financial statements between 2003 and 2012, obtained from the Economática database. The 
sample period was chosen to straddle the year when the use of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) became mandatory in Brazil (2009). The study found that there is impacts  of temporary large positive 
BTDs on the persistence of earnings through aggressive tax planning, before and after adoption of 
international financial reporting standards in Brazil. 
Maria, Ina and Katharina (2016) conducted a meta-analysis aimed at identifying the sources of heterogeneity 
in primary studies and at providing a consensus estimate with respect to the sign and the statistical 
significance level for the examined association. Their meta-regression results show that BTD are indeed 
indicative of opportunistic reporting behavior, and even more so of EM. These results are, however, weaker for  
studies that determine BTD only roughly as the difference between book and estimated taxable income 
instead of using more specific BTD proxies. Moreover, examining actual BTD computed from tax returns 
instead of only approximating these from financial statements strongly increases the effects. Hence, efforts 
taken to accurately determine BTD seem to be worth wile when it comes to the explanatory power for 
opportunistic reporting. 
Salawu, Ogundipe and Yeye (2017) examined the causal relationship between corporate tax planning and firm 
value of non-financial quoted companies in same country between 2004 and 2014. A panel data of financial 
characteristic of 50 non-financial quoted firms spreading over ten sectors were collected from the audited 
annual financial reports of the sampled firms and the Nigeria Stock Exchange fact books. The result indicates 
that causality do not runs in any direction between Tax Planning (ETR) to Firm Value (Tobin Q).  
Sathaya and Thatphong (2019) examined the association of tax planning (hereafter called TP) on financial 
performance (hereafter called FP) in the Stock Exchange of Thailand during the year 2014-2016. The sample 
size, which excludes the financial sector, consists of 873 firm-years. The TP is measured by effective tax rate 
(hereafter called ETR) and the ratio of tax expenses to total assets (hereafter called TAX/ASSET), while the FP is 
measured by return on equity.  
This paper found that the TP has both effects on the FP. The effect is positive when measured by ETR, while it 
is negative if measurement is TAX/ASSET. Regarding to control variables, the BIG4 auditors have positive 
effects on the FP. The results further indicate that the relationship between the FP and TP (measured by 
TAX/ASSET) is significantly negative for non-BIG4 auditors. It is evident from the review of related literature, 
that researches on tax planning and firm value have received too little attention in developing countries. This 
neglect is even more in Cyprus.  
Socialsci Journal Vol 6 (2020) ISSN: 2581-6624                                     http://www.purkh.com/index.php/tosocial 
7 
This study provides insight to ensuring that benefits from tax planning practices are targeted at improving 
shareholders value. 
Methodology 
Research Design 
This study adopted an ex post-facto research design within a panel data framework. It is a combination of both 
time series and cross sectional properties . This is appropriate because the study aims at measuring the effect 
between one variable and another, in which the variables involved are not manipulated by the researcher.  
Population and Sample of the Study 
The population of the study comprised quoted consumer goods manufacturing firms on the Cyprus 
Stock Exchange (CSE) as at end of 2018 financial year. The population included firms. This quoted 
consumer goods manufacturing firms are twenty one (21). 
Method of Data Analyses 
Being a panel data study, the study involve a series of analyses like the descriptive statistics, Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation test, Multi-collinearity test, test for the fixed effect and the random effect as 
well as the Hausman specification test. However multiple regression analysis was used in testing the 
formulated hypotheses using E-View 9.0 statistical software. 
Model Specification 
In testing for the value relevance of corporate tax avoidance and in testing for the moderating effect of 
agency cost mitigating variables on the nexus, we adapt a firm-value model originally derived from 
Ohlson (1995) . Their model centered on Tax Planning, is given as: 
The study modifies the above model to reveal moderating effects of corporate governance on the 
impact of tax planning on firm value.  
FMV = β0+ β1 BVEit + β2 CTAit-1 + β3COGit + β4 PFTit + β5 CAPINTit + β6 LEVit + β7 EXGit + β8 CTA it-1 
*COGit + β8 MVEit DIV + AGE + εit 
The model was modifies thus:   
TOBINS Qίt = β0 + β1FRMSIZίt + + β2 LEVίt + µίt - -Ho3 
TOBINS Qίt = β0 + β1LEVίt + + β2 LEVίt + µίt - -Ho4 
Where:      
TOBINS Q = proxied for Firm Value 
SIZE is Firm size 
LEV is leverage 
Tobins Q 
Ε is error term. 
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Data Presentatıon And Analysıs 
Data analysis 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sampled companies 
 TOBINS FRMSIZ LEV 
Mean 9.003000 1985414. 0.675000 
Median 8.845000 1978403. 0.595000 
Maximum 10.45000 3531654. 1.210000 
Minimum 7.250000 700992.0 0.160000 
Std. Dev. 0.982073 997311.0 0.349770 
Skewness -0.027449 0.103440 0.245419 
Kurtosis 2.342903 1.666202 1.810452 
Jarque-Bera 0.181163 0.759090 0.689978 
Probability 0.913400 0.684173 0.708228 
Sum 90.03000 19854135 6.750000 
Sum Sq. Dev. 8.680210 8.95E+12 1.101050 
Observations 10 10 10 
Source: By Dr. Esra SIPAHI computation (2019) 
Table 1 shows the mean (average) for each of the variables, their maximum values, minimum values, standard 
deviation and Jarque-Bera (JB) Statistics (normality test). The results in Table 1 provided some insight into the 
nature of the selected Cyprus quoted consumer goods companies that were used in this study. Firstly, it was 
observed that on the average over the ten (10) years periods  (2009-2018), the sampled quoted consumer 
goods companies in Cyprus were characterized by positive Firm value (TOBINS’Q = 9.003000).  Lastly, in Table 
1, the Jarque-Bera (JB) which test for normality or the existence of outliers or extreme values among the 
variables, shows that most of the variables are normally distributed at 5% level of significance. This means that 
any variables with outlier are not likely to distort our conclusion and are therefore reliable for drawing 
generalization. This also implies that the least square estimate can be used to estimate the pooled regression 
model. 
Correlation Analysis 
In examining the association among the variables, we employed the Pearson correlation coefficient 
(correlation matrix) 
Table 2: Correlation Analysis Matrix 
 TOBINS FRMSIZ LEV 
TOBINS 1 0.83478 652665 0.20428 623420 
FRMSIZ 0.83478652665 1 0.00033 926979 
LEV 0.20428623420 0.00033 926979 1 
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Source: By Dr. Esra SIPAHI computation (2019) 
The use of correlation matrix in most regression analysis is to check for multi-colinearity and to explore the 
association between each explanatory variable (FRMSIZ and LEV) and the dependent variable (Firm Value) 
proxy as TOBINS Q). Table 2 focused on the correlation between Firm Value measured as Tobins Q and the 
independent variables (FRMSIZ and LEV). Finding from the correlation matrix table shows that all our 
independent variables, (FRMSIZ =0.83 and LEV= 0.20) were observed to be positively associated with Firm 
Value. In checking for multi-colinearity, we noticed that no two explanatory variables were perfectly 
correlated. This means that there is no problem of multi-colinearity between the explanatory variables. Multi-
colinearity may result to wrong signs or implausible magnitudes in the estimated model coefficients, and the  
bias of the standard errors of the coefficients. 
Testing of Hypotheses formulated 
In other to examine the impact relationships between the dependent variable TOBINS Q and the independent 
variables (FRMSIZ and LEV) and to also test our formulated hypotheses, we used a pooled multiple regression 
analysis since the data had both time series (2009-2018) and cross sectional properties (21 consumer goods 
quoted companies). The pooled interaction based multiple regression results are presented and discussed in 
Table 3 below. 
Table 3: TOBINS Q Pooled Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: TOBINS 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 11/15/19 Time: 08:38 
Sample: 2009 2018 
 
Included observations: 10 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statisti c Prob. 
     
     
C 8.950282 0.890992 10.04530 0.0002 
FRMSIZ 1.32E-07 3.18E-07 0.416042 0.6946 
LEV 0.948093 0.606771 1.562523 0.1789 
     
     
R-squared 0.885524 Mean dependent var  9.003000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.793944 S.D. dependent var  0.982073 
S.E. of regression 0.445796 Akaike info criterion  1.528944 
Sum squared resid 0.993672 Schwarz criterion  1.680237 
Log likelihood -2.644721 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.362977 
F-statistic 9.669356 Durbin-Watson stat  2.350885 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.014250    
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Source: By Dr. Esra SIPAHI computation through E-view 9.0 statistical package 
In Table 3, R-squared and adjusted Squared values were (0.88) and (0.79) respectively. The indicates that all 
the independent variables jointly explain about 88% of the systematic variations in Firm Value (TOBINS Q) of 
our samples companies over the ten years periods (2009-2018). The F-statistics (9.67) and its P-value (0.01) 
show that the firm value regression model is well specified. 
Test of Autocorrelation: using Durbin-Waston (DW) statistics which we obtained from our regression result 
in table 4.3, it is observed that DW statistics is 1.86 and an Akika Info Criterion and Schwarz Criterion which 
are 1.52 and 1.68 respectively also further confirms that our model is well specified. In addition to the above, 
the specific findings from each explanatory variable are provided as follows:  
Hypothesis One 
H03: Firm size has no significant effect on affect firm value of Cyprus consumer goods manufacturing 
companies. 
Firm Size (FRMSIZ), based on the t-value of 0.42 and p-value of 0.70 was found to have a positive influence 
on our sampled quoted company’s firm value and this influence is not statistically significant at 5% level since 
its p-value is higher than 0.05 values. This result therefore suggests that we should reject our alternative 
hypothesis three (Ho3) which states that Firm size has no significant effect on affect firm value of Cyprus 
consumer goods manufacturing companies. 
Hypothesis Two 
H03: Leverage (LEV) has no significant effect on affect firm value of Cyprus consumer goods manufacturing 
companies. 
Leverage (LEV), based on the t-value of 1.56 and p-value of 0.18 was found to have a positive influence on 
our sampled quoted company’s firm value and this influence is not statistically significant at 5% level since its 
p-value is higher than 0.05 alpha value. This result therefore suggests that we should reject our alternative 
hypothesis three (Ho3) which states that Leverage (LEV) has no significant effect on affect firm value of Cyprus 
consumer goods manufacturing companies. 
Discussion of Findings 
Firm Size (FRMSIZ) based on findings, was found to influence positively on our dependent variable, Firm 
value. This impact was not statistically significant. This finding therefore supports our aprori expectation and 
the findings of Desai and Dharmapala 2007; Audrey (2012) Mosota (2014) and negates the view of Ohnuma 
(2014). 
Leverage (LEV) based on findings, was found to influence positive on our dependent variable,  Firm Value, but 
this influence was not statistically significant. This finding therefore supports the finding of Mohd Razali, 
Ghazali, Lunyai and Tan Hwang (2018) and negates our aprori expectation and the view of Maria, Ina and 
Katharina (2016). 
Conclusıson and Recommendatıons 
Conclusions 
This study found that leverage and firm size impact positively on firm value, but this impact was not 
statistically significant. In order to maximize the value of the firm, company’s owners would like to minimize 
corporate tax payments net of the private costs of doing so; in other words they want the company to be 
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optimally plan diligently. There has been little rigorous empirical analysis of the benefits and costs to 
corporations of being tax planning. In this study, we attempted to fill this void, at least in part, by investigating 
the market reaction to an initial press mention that a firm was involved in a corporate tax shelter.  
As discussed in the result obtained from the regression reflects that tax planning or ETR has significant and 
negative relationship with firm value, while BTDs has insignificant positive relationship with firm value. 
Therefore, firms with less tax planning may signal to investors the firms have better corporate governance 
compare than firms that engage aggressive tax planning. Based on the findings of the study recommended 
that since the influence of firm size and leverage are not statistically significant and so, the basis of efficient 
use of tax planning for firm value should be encouraged. 
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